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By means of a real-life experiment we investigated employment discrimination against low skilled gay 
men in the Greek private labour market three years after the national adoption of the European anti-
discrimination employment legislation.  
As it first regards occupational access, curriculum vitaes differed only in sexual orientation were faxed 
to advertised job openings. The estimated probability of gays to receive an interview was by 0.261 
lower than that of straights. In addition, exploiting the informal wage offers on the part of tentative 
employers, a wage discrimination factor was found to be 0.026 for gays. As it comes, a taste and/or 
statistical discrimination implied against gays. Adjusted for intra-class correlation the estimated 
differentials were found to be statistically significant (insignificant) for the first (second) measurement.  
In a process to understand the nature of the discrimination we further found that persons’ sex 
responsible for applicants’ selection significantly varied; the estimated probability of males to practice 
occupational access discrimination against gays was by 0.350 higher than that of female. Moreover, 
males were found to practice insignificant wage discrimination of 0.032 against gays, while female 
were found to provide gays with an insignificant wage premium of 0.006 on average.  
The current research contributes to the small academic literature on the economics of discrimination 
according to sexual orientation in Europe. 
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Despite worldwide legal protection impetus sexual orientation discrimination does exist in 
employment. Evidences suggest that the labour market values gay men’s human capital less than that 
of straights. Specifically, gay men have repeatedly claimed that they are fired, not hired, or not 
promoted because of their orientation
1, while the estimated effects of men’s  †homosexuality† on 
earnings are found to be negative. As it comes to the latter issue, surveys from the United States
2, the 
United Kingdom (Arabsheibani, Mani, and Wadsworth [2004]), and the Netherlands (Plug and 
Berkhout [2004]) document annual earning penalties associated with same-sex sexual behavior for 
males, still nonetheless, the estimated penalties significantly vary amongst the surveys and conclusions 
challenged
3. Yet, the systematic study of sexual orientation minorities has made it valuable for both its 
policy relevance and its potential to inform social scientists about the functioning of labour market. 
The current research has taken account of two particular drivers. The first is that no official 
data and empirical studies exist to investigate gay men’s employment terms in Greece. The second is 
the significant Eurobarometer’s findings (2007/263), regarding Greeks’ feeling for homosexuality. 
The survey reveals that the wide majority of Greeks; 0.850 feels that homosexuality is a taboo 
compared to 0.480 of EU, while the wide majority; 0.840 shares the opinion that it is difficult for gays 
and lesbians to state their sexual orientation at work, compared to 0.680 of EU. Starting from the 
mentioned points the scope of the present study is to unbiased investigate whether gay men are facing 
discriminatory practices in the Greek labour market compared to straights, and by thus to evaluate 
whether stereotypical misconception against gays
4 prejudice the Greek employers’ screening processes, 
interestingly three years after the national adoption of the European anti-discrimination employment 
legislation (2005/3304).  
In particular, by means of a Correspondence Test (CT), we first aim to detect sexual orientation 
discrimination at the preliminary stage of the selection process, which for gays seems to be a crucial 
barrier to the labour market. The reason for the latter being is that selection processes are very often 
                                                 
1 See, Badgett, Donnelly and Kibbe (1992); Palmer (1993); Snape, Thomson and Chetwynd (1995); Mason and Palmer 
(1996); Colvin (2004).  
2 See, Badgett (1995); Allegretto and Arthur (2001); Berg and Lien (2001); Black, Hoda, Seth, Lower (2003); Blandford 
(2003), Carpenter (2005, 2007). 
3 The annual earning penalties vary between 0.030-0.300, amongst the referential studies generate insignificant and 
significant results. The economic explanations of the significant effects include theories of gender nonconformity 
(Blandford [2000]), theories of household specialization (Becker [1991]); Black, Honda, Seth, and Lower [2003]) theories 
of human capital endowments (Berg and Lien [2002]; Becker [1993]) and theories of discrimination (Becker [1957], 
Arrow [1972]).   
4 See, Hoffman (1968); Lundahl and Wadensjo (1984);  Seidman (1994). 




not guided by standards, whilst sometimes the standards themselves might lead to the exclusion of 
certain members of minority groups from obtaining a specific job (Liegl, Perching and Weyss [2004]). 
To be specific, a typical CT entails that the researcher sends two -equal in human capital- curriculum 
vitaes to each advertised job opening (Riach and Rich [2002]). However, the only characteristic that 
differs between the two applicants is their sexual orientations. Following Adam (1981) and 
Weichselbaumer (2003), openly gay worker’s sexual orientation is labelled through a reference in his 
curriculum vitae to a voluntary work at a homosexual community. The methodology implies that the 
emanated signal is accurate for credibly testing the discrimination hypothesis
5. Unequal treatments are 
then measured by the difference in the number of call backs for interview between the two groups
6. 
Crucially, in the current study we do concentrate on low-skilled groups as they expected to be at more 
risk for discrimination: Particularly, on non-graduate workers in the private sector (Eurobarometer 
[2003]; [2007]). While we investigate different sectors, that is, on factors that influences variation in 
discriminatory behavior across vacancies. 
Interestingly, in the current experiment, taking advantage of the telephone callbacks on the part 
of employers, as well as of the naïve portfolio of the applicants, we have extended the application of 
the CT technique by also gathering data concerning informal monthly wage offers on the part of 
employers, in the case of tentative hiring
7. We argue that this additional data set enables us to further 
record discriminatory attitudes across sexual orientations in the ensuing steps of the selection process
8. 
While, by extending the CT methodology we provided unbiased empirical evidence on the equivocally 
relationship between sexual orientation and earnings. To preview, we find that gay men face a 
significant probability to be invited for an interview that is by 0.261 less than that of the straights, and 
an insignificant wage discrimination factor of 0.026 on average. Having controlled for all human 
capital asymmetries amongst applicants, a taste and/or statistical discrimination imply against gays. In 
a process to illuminate the outcomes we further show that persons’ sex responsible for applicants’ 
selection varies: The estimated probability of males to practice occupational access discrimination 
against gays is by 0.350 higher than that of females. Furthermore, males are found to practice 
insignificant wage discrimination of 0.032 against gays, while on the other hand, females are found to 
provide gays with an insignificant wage premium of 0.006 on average.  
                                                 
5 For this methodology see also, Riach and Rich (2002), and the European Handbook on Equality Data (2007). 
6Following, Fix and Struyk (1993), the best evidence about discrimination in labour comes from real life experiments.  
7 See also Drydakis and Vlassis (2007). 
8Following Adam Barry (1981), we assume that employers by offering an interview are indicative of their willingness to 




The current study contributes to two areas that have attracted scarce research attention: the 
experimental investigation of employment discrimination in Greece, and investigation of 
discrimination by sexual orientation. Actually, to the best of our knowledge the current experiment is 
the first in Europe which deals with gay men labour discrimination and tests persons’ sex responsible 
for applicants’ selection impact. The experiment offers a purposive analysis of key materials and 
findings which may be significant in relation to public policy concerns and policy development.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we sketch out the European 
anti-discrimination legislation, and we briefly review the theoretical explanations of labour market 
discrimination. In the third section we present the model encapsulating the investigating relationships. 
In the fourth section we describe the methodology and the application structure of the investigation. In 
the fifth section we present and discuss the field results. In the sixth section we present the results of 
the second study examining the correlation between persons’ sex responsible for applicants’ selection 
and labour market discrimination against gays. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Dual Life, European Legislation and Theories of Discrimination  
Psychological and sociological studies suggest that gay men try to avoid discrimination by 
living a dual life at work (Levine and Leonard [1984]). On the labour market they pass for non gay for 
fear that their employment would be in jeopardy if it became known that they are gay, while outside 
labour market they come out
9. Unlike ethnic and racial minorities, the disables and the elderly that are 
vulnerable to discrimination and harassment, gay men may be said to be in the †best position† as they 
can avoid discrimination by hiding their sexual orientation, regardless the drawbacks (Pharr [1988]; 
Byrne [1993]). However, the right to equal opportunity is an important part of the EU’s approach to 
social integration. Union’s institutions come to protect gays and lesbians so that they can undergird 
their identity in employment. The inclusion of Article 13 in the EC Treaty, following the entry into 
force of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, empowered the Union to deal with discrimination on the range 
of sexual orientation. That development in turn led, in 2000, to the unanimous adoption by the Council 
of the Employment Equality Directive (2000/78), aiming to ensure that everybody living in the EU can 
benefit from effective legal protection against sexual orientation discrimination. Greece, for instance, 
                                                 
9 Following Herek (1990), homosexuality pervades societal customs like institutional racism and sexism. It operates 
through a dual process of invisibility and attack. It usually remains culturally invisible; when people who engage in 




by adopting the European Legislation in January 2005
10 (2005/3304), made sexual orientation 
discrimination a legally prohibited act in the labour market
11. 
As regards the theoretical explanations of labour market discrimination, these are concerned 
with how and why productively irrelevant characteristics influence the labour market behavior of 
employers and workers (Swinton [1977]). There is not, however, a generally accepted theory 
explaining labour market discrimination, while there have been a variety of hypotheses for that. The 
two mainstream ones are briefly as follows. The taste hypothesis (Becker [1957]; [1971]) envisions 
discrimination as a preference or taste for which the discriminator is willing to pay. In particular, the 
taste for discrimination on the part of employers is based on the idea that they want to maintain a 
physical or social distance from certain groups, or they may fear that their customers or co-workers 
dislike transacting with minorities i.e. gays. Generally, those groups are socialized so as to perceive 
minorities as inferior and unreliable. However, the wage of the minority applicant would have to 
follow below the wage of majority applicant before the employers would be willing to overcome their 
dislike and hire them. As a result, the demand for minority workers is ceteris paribus lowered, 
depressing their relative wages, while the size of the  †minority penalty† is directly related to the 
strength of the employers’ distaste.  Yet, the trouble with this postulate is that it explicitly contradicts 
the regular view of employers as being profit maximizers.  
On the other hand, the idea that competition may eventually eliminate inefficient 
discrimination led to the development of the statistical discrimination hypothesis (Arrow [1972]; 
[1973]; Phelps [1972]; Aigner and Clain [1977]). Discrimination results from the profit maximizing 
response of employers to uncertainty about the quality of individual workers, while the real or 
subjective distributions favour the group which receives preferences i.e. straights. Statistical models of 
discrimination predict that if employers perceive minorities as being generally less productive than 
majorities, and if it is difficult to measure the actual workers’ productivity, then minorities with above-
                                                 
10In particular, the #2005/3004 applies to a range of grounds, including racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, age, 
disability and sexual orientation (regarding both the public and private sectors), in relation to: (a) Conditions for access to 
employment, to self-employment and to occupation, selection criteria and recruitment conditions, whatever is the branch of 
activity and the level of the professional hierarchy (including promotion). (b) Access to all types and to all levels of 
vocational guidance, vocational training, advanced vocational training and retraining, including practical work experience. 
(c) Employment and working conditions, including dismissals and pay, (d) Membership of and involvement in an 
organization of workers or employers, or any organization whose members carry on a particular profession, including the 
benefits provided for by such organizations, (e) Social protection, including social security and health care, (f) Social 
advantages, (g) Education, (h) Access to the supply of goods and services which are available to the public (including 
housing).   




average productivity may receive below-average returns. If this is the case, a price markup and/or 
exclusionary tactics are asked so as to compensate for lower expected profit and/or higher risk.   
However, any or a combination, of the above explanations can be validated by the CT results 
that follow. Any theory of the cause of discrimination make predictions about the circumstances under 
discrimination will occur, and CT’s data make it possible to determine which predictions are supported 
by employers’ behavior
12 . More importantly, those results can significantly contribute to our 
perception about what may amongst else affect the opportunities of certain minority groups to access 
occupations and thus uncover well concealed discrimination which is hard to detect by other means. 
At the same time, the potential of directly collecting discrimination data may further support anti-




3. The Model 
The above practices imply that discrimination in the Greek labour market may take various 
forms and be related with the candidate employees’ -other than productivity- characteristics. 
Stemming from that, in this paper we particularly examine whether sexual orientation affects: First, 
the probability (PCB) of an applicant to receive a call-back for a job interview. Second, the monthly 
wage offer ( W CB) on the part of the applicant’s (tentative) employer. We respectively specify the 
following estimable relationships. 
PCB(callback=1) = α1 + β1  sexual orientation + u1                                                               (1) 
WCB = α2 + β2  sexual orientation + u2                                                                                             (2)                                                
By construction of this CT (see, amongst else, Neumark, Bank and Van Nort [1996]; Bertrand 
and Mullainathan [2004]), all applicants have to be matched in all characteristics (e.g. age, human 
capital, marital status, masculinity etc) other than sexual orientation; sexual orientation takes the value 
of 1 (0) if the candidate is straight (gay) and its impact is measured by the 1 b , and  2 b  coefficients. 
Moreover, having controlled for same but sexual orientation characteristics across the two applicants, 
                                                 
12 Taste and/or statistical hypothesis of discrimination against gay men can be crystallized in the terms: Homophobia, 
Heterosexism and Sexual Prejudice. Following, Weinberg (1972) homophobia is used to label heterosexuals' dread of 
being in close quarters with homosexuals as well as homosexuals' self loathing. In general, distastes and phobia focus on 
homosexual peoples’ behaviour, lifestyle and culture. Heterosexism is used as a term analogous to sexism and racism, 
describing an ideological system that denies, denigrates, and stigmatizes any nonheterosexual form of behaviour, identity, 
relationship, or community (Herek [1990]). The term highlights the parallels between antigay sentiment and other forms of 
prejudice, such as racism, anti-Semitism, and sexism. While, sexual prejudice refers to all negative attitudes based on 
sexual orientation, whether the target is homosexual, bisexual, or heterosexual. The prejudice is almost always directed at 
people who engage in homosexual behaviour or label themselves gay, lesbian, or bisexual (Herek [2000]). 




the latter is not expected to be correlated with the error term in each equation. As in particular regards 
the second relationship; wage offers are of course observed only if an applicant receives a call-back. 
Still, nonetheless, there has been no form of omitted variables which may have bias those offers; the 
same independent variable, i.e. sexual orientation, presumably influences call-backs as well as 
informal wage offers. Hence, as well no correlation should be expected amongst error terms across the 
two equations (see, e.g., Green [2003]; Sartori [2003]; Heckman [1990])
14.  
What does really matter in the field experiment, nonetheless, is the intra-class correlation 
among the dependent variables (see, e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan [2004]). Regarding the first 
relationship, two curriculum vitaes were sent to the same firm; hence the probability of the straight 
(gay) applicant to receive a call-back is rather correlated with the probability of the gay (straight) 
applicant to receive one. Similarly, in the second relationship, firms’ wage offers to the straight (gay) 
applicant are expected to be correlated with their offers to the gay (straight) applicant. Thus, in order 
to correctly analyze the data those correlations are needed to be taken into account. If not, the standard 
errors would be underestimated, rendering invalidity to our significance tests
15.  In the estimations that 
follow full information-adjusted standard errors are therefore reported
16.   
 
4. Methodology and Application Structure  
Descending the seminal paper of Riach and Rich (2002) different forms of field experiments 
have been used to test for discrimination in hiring
17 . Due to their controllability and the unequivocal 
measurement which they entail
18 these real-life experiments have become quite popular and they have 
been carried out in at least fifteen countries/states
19.  
                                                 
14 Note, that Heckman selection models (ML, Two Steps) are not appropriate, as both equations include only the same 
independent variable: sexual orientation.  
15 The intra-class correlation is a measure of variation between and within clusters of individuals (see, e.g., Fleiss, Levin 
and Paik [2003]).  Specifically, the within-cluster correlation will affect the power of a trial, because a greater homogeneity 
of cluster members will increase the standard error of the estimate of the treatment effect. This results into a loss of power 
to detect a difference between the intervention and control groups.   
16 See, Stata Library: Analyzing Correlated Clustered Data. 
17 There are two other procedures that had been previously used to measure discrimination in the labour market. These 
methods involve personal approaches, in which individuals either apply over telephone (Brown and Gay [1985]; Hubbuck 
and Carter [1980]) or they attend job interviews (Daniel [1968]; McIntosh and Smith [1974]). 
18 CT can only be effective in demonstrating discrimination at the initial stage of a selection process, as well as in 
measuring the results of the selection process (see Bertrand and Mullainathan [2004]). However, in our context, one cares 
about whether a candidate will eventually get a job, as well as about the wage offered conditional on getting the job. Whilst, 
in real life, job and wage offerings are also obtained via informal search and networks (see Allosino, Reyneri, Venturini 
and Zincone [2004]; Olli Segendorf and Rooth [2006]).  
19 In Europe such experiments have been carried out in Belgium, Germany, Greece, Denmark, England, France, Italy, 




Our experiment was conducted between December 2006 to September 2007 and involved the 
capital of Greece, Athens. In order to measure occupational access discrimination for gays, we had 
fabricated two imaginary, equal in human-capital workers/testers, applying to the same job by sending 
curriculum vitaes using different fax devices. The occupations, to which we have been focused on, 
covered a large spectrum of job quality: office jobs, industry jobs, café and restaurant services and 
shop sales. These occupations have been chosen because, while there as well have been many low 
skilled vacancies in agriculture, construction, cleaning, and delivery, in most of the latter cases only 
telephone contact was available. Interestingly, however, the investigated occupations allowed for 
further classification in accordance to the nature of the research. It is rather obvious that a key issue 
that arise when low skilled gay applicants seek for a job is the visibility and invisibility of equality, 
tolerance and diversity in relation to their sexual orientation in sectors.  Though industry vacancies as 
the masculine jobs, café-restaurant services and sales vacancies as the gay friendly jobs while office 
vacancies as the most status jobs, regarding the sample, we had a further dimension to take into 
account
20.  
Next, we applied to vacancies where there was demand for eight-hour and five-day 
employment. These vacancies were identified through a random sample of advertisements, appearing 
in website newspapers, and as we have already mentioned we concentrated on low-skilled groups as 
they expected to be at more risk for discrimination. The curriculum vitaes were faxed simultaneously, 
within one day of the advertisement appearance, and if firms were interested about any of the 
applicants they could be reached either through an available postal address
21, or by telephone contact. 
The qualifications and the presentation style of our two fictitious applicants were matched as closely 
as possible, so that they were identical in all employment relevant characteristics but sexual orientation. 
While, each application was designed so as to equally convey the type of experience that might make 
an applicant attractive. Each of our fictitious applicants/testers was allocated a male Greek distinctive 
first and last name, a mobile telephone number, and a postal address. The addresses were chosen so 
that to be recognized as similar as possible, in order to indicate the same social class. Applications 
showed the same level of schooling and job experience. Both candidates had finished high schools, 
approximately twelve years ago (Appendix 1). Furthermore, the applicants were 29 years old, 
unmarried, and had carried out military service in different areas
22. Both candidates had nine years of 
                                                 
20 See, Colgan, Greegan, McKearney and Wright (2006). 
21 However, no firm responded in a written way. 
22 In Greece, having carried out the military service typically boosts a male’s probability of being hired. Thus, in order our 




work experience in a similar post to each vacancy applying for, while, to avoid detection, the 
candidates’ high schools and previous workplaces were located at different areas in Athens. Moreover, 
both applicants had similar hobbies and personal characteristics entailed similar masculinity
23. 
However, the two applicants were identical apart from their sexual orientation. The gay’s 
application was denoted by a reference in the personal information part, of the line †member volunteer 
in the Athenian Homosexual Community†. To control the probability that the activity may create 
holdbacks in his present duties it had ended. Also, in case that †activism† might bias the selection 
process, the straight’s curriculum vitae mentioned a past volunteerism in an environmental community 
too. For obvious reasons, the styles of the curriculum vitaes and cover letters were different for each 
pair. Yet, in order to control for the possibility the style of an application to influence an employer’s 
response, those two -different in style- application forms were equally allocated between the straight 
and gay applicants. For the same reason, applications were sent alternately to each vacancy; in half 
cases the straight (the gay) application was first sent. Both experimental controls adjusted in the 
regression stage
24. 
Following, whenever firms called for arranging appointments with the applicants the two 
testers were trying to raise informal questions, concerning monthly wage offers. To verify that the 
testers were identical to all  †observed†, in the telephone contact, characteristics e.g. accent
25, 
masculinity, articulation, age and mansuetude, and that they were also responding equally, either to 
employers’ clarifications or to their own questions, we had conducted pre-tests: Having recorded a 
testers’ pilot rehearsal, considerable numbers of individuals were asked to confirm the relevant issues. 
Our true experiment then began only after a unanimous advocacy had been reached. On the other hand, 
however, we must note that it is off course impossible to test a firm’s truthfulness, until a candidate is 
actually hired. 
 
5. Field Results 
Having completed field-data collection
26 we subsequently evaluated the effects of  sexual 
orientation by estimating equations (1) and (2), using the entire data set, as well as separately for each 
                                                 
23 Gay men who violate genders rules face considerable prejudice as their mannerism is inconsistent with society’s 
expectations about masculinity (Levine [1998]; Herek [2004]). 
24 For an extensive study on control variables and random events see Fix and Struyk (1993).   
25 Both testers have been chosen to have a masculine accent entailed similar gender. The researcher is quite concerned that 
the level of wage discrimination might be greater against the gay applicant with womanish accent.    




one of our four reference occupations. The coefficient estimations, effectively regarding gay-straight 
paired differences, are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 below. 







































Notes:  Standard errors (s.e) are adjusted for intra-class correlation. Statistically Significant at 1 %(*); 5 %(**).  
 
Table 1, shows that the gay labelled applicants face a marginal probability to be invited for an 
interview that is by 0.261 less than that of the straights on average. Though, heterogeneity amongst 
sectors, the probability varies across them: In office jobs gay men face 0.304 less probability to be 
invited for interview, followed by 0.289 in shop sales, 0.248 in industries, and 0.211 in restaurants and 
café services. The findings provide significant evidence that, of the two identical applicants engaging 
in an identical job search, the gay would receive fewer interview callbacks. It implied that gay men 
relative to straights have to spend more time, effort, and resources, for an interview, as the same 
observable signal is more precise for straights than gays. Therefore, on the part of employers taste 
and/or statistical discrimination is implied against gays.  
Mentionable, although applicants by construction appeared to be similar, they do look different 
to employers. The findings reveal differences among the two counter pairs, across sectors, while at the 
same time suggest that, no matter the status of the vacancies, discrimination is well founded, with the 
straight applicants always having advantages: In all low-skill occupations the gay applicant is found to 
face significant constraints in the selection process. Nonetheless, naturally considering office jobs 
being a higher-status sector, the findings reveal that in these vacancies gay applicants face the higher 
occupational access constraints. Interestingly and parallel to the above analysis, gay applicants do not 
seem to enjoy a significant access premium in the gay-friendly occupations. Regardless norm ordains; 
“unskilled young gays to be dovetailed and segregated in sales and café-restaurant services”, the 
estimations can not countersign the fact. Actually, in industries the gay applicants face a less 
discrimination factor than that in shop sales. 
Moreover, we have re-estimated equation (1) including (adjusted) two binary controls variables: 
Curriculum vitaes’ sending order and type style, still nonetheless their impact on the relevant outcome 
is negligible (see, Appendix 3, Table 3.1). The coefficients estimations indicate statistically significant 




amongst the four sectors. Since experimental conditions are equally assigned, these controls do not 
substantially affect the estimated effect of sexual orientation, but they make the estimate more precise. 
Turning next to equation (2), Table 2, the estimations entail that the gay labelled applicants 
face a monthly  †sexual orientation penalty† of 18.33€, producing a wage discrimination 
factor
27d=0.026, which is a statistically insignificant outcome on average. Separately in each sector we 
found similarly insignificant small effects. The higher penalty is found in shop sales (14.97€ 
[d=0.023]), followed by office jobs (8.77€ [d=0.011]), restaurant and café services (6.07€ [d=0.009]), 
and industries (2.91€ [d=0.003]).  
 







































Notes: Standard errors (s.e) are adjusted for intra-class correlation. Statistically Significant at 1 %(*); 5 %(**).  
 
 
In all sectors the wage differentials of this magnitude represents an insignificant loss in gay’s welfare. 
As it comes, the lower relative to straights, accessibility of gays to the reference occupations entails 
discriminatory but statistically insignificant effects in the ensuing steps of the selection process. 
Although, the implied penalty required for adequate compensation it is not high enough as to arouse 
the suspicion of the prospective seekers, it seems that employers may consider gays as being less 
productive than straights, hence, the former would have to suffer the monthly sexual orientation 
penalty, whenever employed; and/or employers might be willing to overcome a taste against gays if 
their wages fall bellow those of straights. Interestingly, the estimations indicate that in industries the 
discrimination factor get its lower value, compared to others. Partially, it implied that masculinity does 
not fight it out gays’ welfare.  However, someone could further claim that in industries as well as in 
office jobs wages are rather fixed, mainly on payroll criteria, and thus they can not be extensively 
fluctuated depending on irrelevant to human capital endowments
28.     
For a deeper investigation, we have re-estimated equation (2) limited the sample only to those 
cases where both applicants/testers received a wage offer (Appendix 3, Table 3.2, Panel A). The 
coefficients estimations indicate a less insignificant income disadvantage of about; 0.008-0.019, 
                                                 
27 This factor d typically measures the strength of the firms’ bias regarding –informal- wage offers, i.e., the % by which the 
wage of the gay applicant would have to fall below the wage of the straight before firms are prepared to consider both as 
equally employable.  So,d corresponds to marginal effect.  




generating a wage discrimination factor of 0.015, against gays on average. Similarly, in shop sales the 
wage discrimination factor gets the higher value while in office jobs it gets the lower value. 
Furthermore, including to the latter regression a binary variable: Firms’ callbacks order, its impact is 
found to be negligible (Appendix 3, Table 3.2, Panel B). Thus, whether firms had contacted the 
straight (gay) applicant first (second) it is rather oblivious to the wages offers.    
 
6. Discussion: Sex and Discrimination  
Having estimated a significant degree of occupational access discrimination against gays we 
were interested also in investigating whether persons’ sex responsible for applicants’ selection could 
determine discriminatory attitudes. Following, Kimmel (1994) and Kimmel and Mahler (2003), sexual 
orientation discrimination is not evenly distributed throughout society, but is more or less pronounced 
according to demographic characteristics. An sizeable amount of empirical surveys show individuals’ 
attitudes toward gay men to be consistently correlated with sex (Yang [1997]; Davis, Yarber, 
Bauserman, Schreer and Davis [1998]).  
To attempt to assess the role of these, in the current experiment whenever firms had call 
backed applicants in order to arrange an appointment the testers gathered specifically information 
concerning interlocutors’ status. The methodology enabled: To effectively identify those persons i.e., 
employers and managers, who were responsible for the applicants’ selection, and effectively to register 
their sex. Persons’ sex responsible for applicants’ selection impact on gay’s
29 terms of employment is 
summarized in Table 3 and 4, below. 







































Notes: The dependent binary variable is total invitations-discriminations for the gay applicant. Sex impact is measured by the 
coefficients βSo. Standard errors (s.e) are adjusted for intra-class correlation. Statistically Significant at 1 %(*), 5 %(**).  
 .  
Table 3, reveals significant results that can not be underestimated. On average, gays’ 
occupational access significantly varies depending on persons’ sex responsible for applicants’ 
                                                 
29 Notice that discriminatory treatments against the straight applicants are generally attributed to random events. Following, 
Wienk, Clifford, Simonson and Eggers (1979) the share of calls in which a minority applicant is favored provides an 
estimate of the extent to which random factors are at work. In our case the occupational access discrimination against the 
straight applicant was a negligibly outcome; 0.005, which made unable to test for any correlation between persons’ sex 




selection. The estimated probability of males to discriminate against gays is by 0.350 higher than that 
of females on average
30. Analytically, in shop sales the estimated probability of males to discriminate 
against gays is by 0.393 higher than that of females, while in office jobs is also higher by 0.356. In 
industries and café-restaurant vacancies, however, persons’ sex responsible for applicants’ selection 
insignificantly stands
31. Moreover, as Table 4 shows, males practice insignificant sexual orientations 
penalties of 22.13€ [0.032] against gay labelled applicants, Panel A, while females provide them with 
an insignificant wage premium of 4.52€ [0.006], Panel B, on average.  
 





































































Notes:In Panel A, the dependent variable is  males’ wage offers.  In Panel B, the dependent variable is females’ wage offers.  Sex impact 
is measured by the coefficients βSpm and βSpf. Standard errors (s.e) are adjusted for intra-class correlation. Statistically Significant at 1 
%(*), 5 %(**).  
.  
In particular, if the persons responsible for applicants’ selection are males; a sexual orientation 
penalty against gays exists of 21.08€ [0.033] in shop sales, followed by 13.57€ [0.018] in office jobs, 
by 3.41€ [0.005] in restaurant-café services and by 2.94€ [0.004] in industries. On the other hand, if 
persons responsible for applicants’ selection are females; an insignificant wage premium for gays is 
identified in shop sales of 7.65€ [0.011] and in offices of 5.14€ [0.006]. However, in restaurant-café 
services a sexual orientation penalty for gays implied which is higher by 28.33€ [0.044], followed by 
14.00€ [0.021] in industries
32. 
                                                 
30 Notice, that in those cases where the gay applicant was invited for interview, persons’ sex responsible for applicants’ 
selection was assigned by the relevant tester. Meanwhile, in those cases where the gay was discriminated, persons’ sex 
responsible for applicants’ selection was effectively assigned by the straight tester.  
31 In these vacancies the representation of female employers was scarce restricted volatility. 
32 Furthermore, we have re-estimated the relation limited the sample only to those cases where both applicants/testers 
received a wage offer (see, Appendix 3, Table 3.2, Panel A&B). On average, as Panel A and B show, male and female 
persons responsible for applicants’ selection practice insignificant sexual orientations penalties against gays of 13.97€ 
[0.021], and of 2.27€ [0.003], respectively.  As it comes, if persons responsible for applicants selection are males, the 
sexual orientation penalty against gays is of 14.21€ [0.021] in restaurant-café services, followed by 14.05€ [0.003] in shop 
sales, by 10.62 € [0.015] in industries, and by 10.00€ [0.013] in offices (Panel A). Consequently, the estimations indicate a 
less insignificant income disadvantage. On the other hand, if persons responsible for applicants selection are females, the 
sexual orientation penalty against gays is of 15.00€ [0.024] in restaurant-café services, followed by 5.00€ [0.007] in shop 




Utilized persons’ sex responsible for applicants’ selection, there are some patterns in the results 
which provide some interesting insights. It seems that males are more reluctant in their reactions to 
homosexuality as they are significantly more prone to practice higher occupational access 
discrimination than females (see, Kitien and Whitley [1998]). Yet, following Herek (1986), males’ 
relationship between homophobia and masculinity is evident in the first place in their relatively 
stronger allegiance to homophobic attitudes. Indeed, males include stronger beliefs than females about 
genders, morality, and danger by which men homosexuality is defined as  †inferior† which 
predetermine their attitudes (see e.g., Davis, Yarber, Bauserman, Schreer and Davis [1998]). Actually, 
the estimations indicate that males do inflict higher sexual orientation penalties to overcome their 
dislikes and/or uncertainty for gay labelled applicants.  
However, we must keep in mind that a complete understanding of gay men discrimination 
requires analysis of its roots in culture and social interactions, as well as individual thought processes. 
Definitely, people’s attitudes are formed on the basis of personal experiences, beliefs norms and 
standards as well as on actual contextual events
33 (Herek [1992], [2004]; Pharr [1998]).  
 
7. Conclusions  
In 2000 the European Union had instituted specific legislation aiming to lay down a framework 
for combating discrimination in the labour market. Briefly, that legislation made clear that people 
affected by discrimination should have adequate means of legal protection against unequal treatments, 
and an effective right of redress. It proves, however, that a history of discrimination cannot turn 
overnight. This study is the first in Greece using a Correspondence Test to examine whether sexual 
orientation discrimination against gay men exists in the Greek labour market.  
Focus on the selection process our results reveal significant sexual orientation differences in 
access to occupations, and insignificant in wage offers. Gay men relative to straights have to spend 
more effort, and resources, for an interview, as the same observable signal is more precise for straights 
than gays. In particular, the estimated probability of gays to receive an interview invitation is found to 
be by 0.261 lower than that of the straights, while the wage discrimination factor is estimated to be 
0.026 for gays. The estimations suggest that it is required a willingness to spend amounts of time job-
                                                 
33 Although CT can not measure other than occupational access and wage discrimination against gay applicants; during the 
experiment we became ourselves victims of abuses and bulling. After a short period of CVs sending the gay applicant’s-
tester’s mobile started to receive intimidating calls (from males) and sms regarding his sexual orientation, which lasted up 
to the end of the experiment. Although we can not identified whether the calls came from employers, managers or other 
employees, or whether the gay labelled applicant have been rejected or called for interview, the experience came to 




hunting if men are openly gay, while the wage differentials of this magnitude would represent an 
insignificant loss in gay’s welfare. Last but not least, in a process to illuminate the outcomes, we 
further find that persons’ sex responsible for applicants’ selection significantly varies; the estimated 
probability of males to practice occupational access discrimination against gays is by 0.350 higher 
than that of female. Furthermore, males are found to practice insignificant wage discrimination of 
0.032 against gays, while female are found to provide gays with an insignificant wage premium of 
0.006 on average.  
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Curriculum vitaes’ Type Style – Synopses 
Applicant: A 
 
Curriculum Vitae  
First Name:  
Last Name: 
Ethnicity: Greek 
Marital Status: Unmarried  
Date of Birth: .../.../1978 
Address: Location 
Telephone: Mobile 




Certificate of Greek high school in 1996,  Location 
Basic Knowledge of English and P/C 




From August 1998 to January 2000         
Appointment/ Firm 
From March 2000 to March 2003            
Appointment/ Firm 
From April 2003 to …200(6)7                  
Appointment/ Firm 
 
Interests: Sports and Travels  
Member volunteer in the Athenian Homosexual 
Community (01-05)  
 












First Name           
Last Name  
 
Date of Birth .../.../1978 
Ethnicity Greek 






Appointment/ Firm  
February1998- November1999 
Appointment/ Firm       
December1999-July 2004 





Certificate of Greek high school in 1996, 
Location 
English Basic Knowledge 




Military Services Carried Out in 1998 
Hobbies Volunteer in the Olympus:  
Environmental Union from 1999-2003, 
Travels/Sports    

























Appendix 2 Table 2.1 Invitation to Interviews; Actual Observations & Probabilities 
 
 
Occupations    







Total Invitations  




































Table 2.2 Invitation to Interviews; Actual Observations & Probabilities 


















































Table 2.3 Monthly Wages Offers (€); Entire Data Set  


















































































Sexual Orientation  Curriculum Vitaes’ 
Sending 
Order 












































































































Notes:  The three variables are pooled simultaneously. Standard errors (in the parenthesis) are adjusted for intra-class correlation. 
Statistically Significant at 1 %(*); 5 %(**). 
 










Sexual Orientation      Firms’ Callbacks 













































































































Appendix 4 Table 4.1 Coefficient Estimations & Marginal Effects; Independent Variable: Persons’ Sex Responsible for Applicants’ 







































































Notes: In Panel A, the dependent variable is  males’ wage offers.  In Panel B, the dependent variable is females’ wage offers.  Sex impact is 
measured by the coefficients βSpm 
l and βSpf 
l
 . Standard errors (in the parenthesis) are adjusted for intra-class correlation. Statistically 
Significant
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